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Climate Balkanization: Dormant Commerce and the
Limits of State Energy Policy
Jonathan H. Adler*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, states have enacted an array of policies to
encourage the use of renewable energy sources and otherwise
reduce the carbon intensity of energy production.1 Such policies
range from subsidies for desired forms of energy, to market-share
mandates, to direct regulation of emissions.2 As has become
somewhat traditional, California has been particularly aggressive
in its adoption of regulatory measures.3
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1. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Climate Policy and the United States System
of Divided Powers: Dealing with Carbon Leakage and Regulatory Linkage, 3
TRANSNATIONAL ENVTL. L. 31, 34 (2014), (“By 2006, every state had enacted
legislation relevant to climate change.”); Uma Outka, Environmental Law and
Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable Energy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1693
(2012) (noting state and local initiatives to promote renewable energy); James
W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, FORDHAM L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 13) (“[S]tates remain the focus of energy
regulation and the most important energy policy innovators.”). See also
generally Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions to Global
Problems: State, Local, and Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to
Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L.
REV. 15 (2004).
2. For a survey of relevant state policies, see David R. Hodas, State
Initiatives, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 303–40 (Jody Freeman
& Michael Gerrard eds., 2d ed. 2014). See also Lesley K. McAllister, Cap-andTrade, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 341–74 (Jody Freeman &
Michael Gerrard eds., 2d ed. 2014) (discussing state-level emission trading
policies).
3. See Ann E. Carlson, Regulatory Capacity and State Environmental
Leadership: California's Climate Policy, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 65
(2013). See also Kimberly Cobo, California Global Warming Solutions Act of
2006: Meaningfully Decreasing Greenhouse Gas Emissions or Merely A Set of
Empty Promises?, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 447, 453 (2007); infra Part IV.B. See
also generally DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 259–60 (1995) (discussing the
“California effect,” whereby California’s leadership in environmental regulation
has encouraged replication in other jurisdictions).
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Many of these state-level policies have been justified as efforts
to address the threat of global climate change by reducing
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the energy sector.4 Until
the Supreme Court determined that GHGs could be regulated as
“pollutants” under the Clean Air Act (CAA) in 2007,5 the federal
government had failed to take any meaningful regulatory actions to
reduce GHG emissions.6 This lack of action left room for the states
to fill.7 Indeed, by some accounts, state regulatory efforts were
driven, in part, by a desire to spur federal climate legislation.8
4. See Jim Rossi, The Political Economy of Energy and Its Implications for
Climate Change Legislation, 84 TULANE L. REV. 379, 401 (2009) (“[S]tate and
local governments have taken a particularly aggressive approach to addressing
climate change, in many instances beating federal regulators and Congress to the
punch.”); BARRY G. RABE, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
GREENHOUSE AND STATEHOUSE: THE EVOLVING STATE ROLE IN CLIMATE
CHANGE ix (2002) (“The trend is unmistakably towards more states taking an
active role in climate change.”).
5. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534–35 (2007).
6. See Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives for State and
Local Climate Change Initiatives, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 119, 119 (2008). Since
2008, however, the federal government has proposed and promulgated several
regulations controlling emissions of greenhouse gases. See also Reconsideration of
Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act
Permitting Programs (Timing Rule), 75 Fed. Reg. 17004 (Apr. 2, 2010) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 70, 71), invalidated by Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v.
EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission
Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (Tailpipe Rule), 75 Fed.
Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600 and 49 C.F.R.
pts. 531, 533, 536, 537, 538); Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule (Tailoring Rule), 75 Fed. Reg. 31514 (June 3, 2010)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71), invalidated by Util. Air Regulatory
Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); Endangerment and Cause or Contribute
Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act
(Endangerment Finding), 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. ch. 1); Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830 (proposed June 18,
2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified
and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed.
Reg. 34960 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). For an
overview of federal regulatory initiatives triggered by Massachusetts v. EPA, see
Jonathan H. Adler, Heat Expands All Things: The Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas
Regulation under the Obama Administration, 34 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y 421
(2011).
7. See Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 282 (2003) (noting that many states
“have quietly begun to fill the void in leadership that some believe exists at the
national level”).
8. See Engel & Orbach, supra note 6, at 126–27 (providing examples of
state and local governments pooling resources to compel the federal government
to pursue regulatory action on climate change). See also Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,

2014]

CLIMATE BALKANIZATION

155

Through the imposition of mandates on what sorts of energy
may be produced or sold, state regulatory efforts have imposed
burdens on interstate energy markets. In some cases, these burdens
are explicit, as when states have privileged in-state energy sources
at the expense of out-of-state producers or sellers.9 In other cases,
these burdens are the inevitable consequence of state efforts to
reduce the environmental impacts of energy consumed within the
state.10 Such restrictions, and their associated burdens on interstate
commerce, raise serious constitutional questions. Under the socalled “Dormant Commerce Clause,”11 state regulations that
discriminate against out-of-state actors are presumptively
unconstitutional, as are state regulations that seek to extraterritorialize a state’s regulatory choices. Even purportedly nondiscriminatory measures may be suspect if they impose an
excessive burden on interstate commerce in relation to the in-state
benefits they produce.
Advocates of these policies argue that such effects are the
necessary consequence of state efforts to reduce GHG emissions.12

Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative
Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 20 (2007) (stating that state laws “spur interest
groups to raise issues that might otherwise never receive congressional
attention”); E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution:
The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326 (1985)
(noting that much of federal environmental law is a result of special interest
groups opposing inconsistent and stringent state regulatory standards).
9. See infra notes 192–98 and accompanying text.
10. See Coleman, supra note 1; Yvonne Gross, Kyoto, Congress, or Bust:
The Constitutional Invalidity of State CO2 Cap-and-Trade Programs, 28 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 205, 222 (2005) (“State-level approaches to regulating
GHGs, while laudable, will inevitably impact interstate markets, thereby
implicating the constitutional limits on state action imposed by the Commerce
Clause.”).
11. The title “Dormant Commerce Clause” can be attributed to Chief Justice
John Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). See Sidney M.
Wolf, The Solid Waste Crisis: Flow Control and the Commerce Clause, 39 S.D.
L. REV. 529, 569 n.88 (1994). In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall, in
dicta, wrote that the power to regulate interstate commerce “can never be
exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents,
or lie dormant.” 22 U.S. at 189. See also Michael S. Greve, The Dormant
Commerce Clause as an Ex Ante Rule, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 241, 241 (2007)
(noting criticism of doctrine as “debatable inference at best and a wholesale
judicial invention at worst”).
12. See, e.g., Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant
Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State
Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 337 (2013); Alexandra Klass
& Elizabeth Henley, Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality, and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, SAN. DIEGO J. OF CLIMATE & ENERGY L. (forthcoming 2014)
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Climate change, after all, is a “super wicked” problem, and GHG
emissions are ubiquitous.13 Mitigating the threat of climate change
requires aggressive measures, including the comprehensive
regulation of energy production, distribution, and use.14 If states
are to be effective in trying to address climate change, advocates
argue that incidental burdens on interstate commerce are
inevitable.15 Yet, given that climate change is a global problem, no
state on its own has the ability to have any meaningful effect on
projected changes to the earth’s climate.16 Even if every state in the
nation were to adopt these sorts of policies, projections of future
warming due to anthropogenic emissions of GHGs would remain
largely unchanged.17 Nevertheless, should every state adopt such
policies, the nation’s energy markets could become quite
balkanized.18 Whether states can proceed on their current course
will be determined by courts’ willingness to enforce traditional
constitutional constraints on discriminatory and extraterritorial
state legislation.
Part I of this Article briefly surveys the state role in energy
regulation. Part II outlines the constitutional constraints that may

[hereinafter Klass & Henley, Energy Policy]; Michael Barsa & David A. Dana,
A Climate Change Lens on the Dormant Commerce Clause, Lifecycle GHG
Taxes, and In-State RPS Requirements, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L.
69 (2014).
13. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153,
1159–61 (2009) (describing climate change as a “super wicked” problem).
14. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (2009).
15. Gross, supra note 10. (finding that “[s]tate-level approaches to
regulating GHGs, while laudable, will inevitably impact interstate markets,
thereby implicating the constitutional limits on state action imposed by the
Commerce Clause.”).
16. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1963 (2007).
17. On the enormity of the challenge of mitigating global climate change
through emission reductions, see Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize:
Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5–12 (2011). See also Robert D. Atkinson & Darrene Hackler,
Ten Myths of Addressing Global Warming and the Green Economy, INFO. TECH.
& INNOVATION FOUND. 1 (June 2010), www.itif.org/files/2010-green-economymyths.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z2VM-S2X4 (noting that “the magnitude
of change needed is much larger than many realize[;] many conventional
solutions simply won’t achieve the global scale needed.”).
18. For an in-depth look as to how regulation balkanized gasoline markets
and the related consequences, see generally Andrew P. Morriss & Nathaniel
Stewart, Market Fragmenting Regulation: Why Gasoline Costs so Much (and
Why it's Going to Cost Even More), 72 BROOK. L. REV. 939 (2007).
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limit such regulation by states, including the Dormant Commerce
Clause. Part III discusses how courts have applied the Dormant
Commerce Clause to energy-related regulation by states. Part IV
looks at contemporary state policies that may raise particular
Dormant Commerce Clause concerns due to privileging in-state
interests and discriminating against out-of-state energy producers.
In the end, the extent to which the Dormant Commerce Clause
constrains state energy and climate policies will depend upon the
level of enthusiasm the Supreme Court retains for enforcing
traditional norms against anti-competitive state action.
I. STATE-LEVEL ENERGY POLICIES
Both the federal and state governments play a role in the
regulation of energy exploration, production, and distribution,
along with the consequential environmental effects. In
environmental policy more broadly, there is active debate on the
optimal distribution of regulatory authority between the federal and
state governments.19 Federal authority to regulate interstate
commerce necessarily extends to the regulation of energy markets,
and is understood to include federal authority to regulate the
environmental consequences of commercial and industrial activity,

19. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Making Environmental Regulation More
Adaptive Through Decentralization: The Case for Subsidiarity, 52 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1377 (2005); Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 130 (2005) [hereinafter Adler, Mismatch];
DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON (2005);
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale,
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 206 (2002); Wallace E.
Oates, A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in RECENT ADVANCES
IN ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 22 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002);
Kirsten Engel & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Federalism in the
United States: The Risks of Devolution, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 137 (Daniel C. Esty &
Damien Geradin eds., 2001); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental
Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001); Rena I.
Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351
(2000); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 570 (1996); HENRY BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM
TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1996); Peter P. Swire, The Race to
Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition
Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 67 (1996). For
a survey of the empirical literature on jurisdictional choice in environmental
law, see Daniel L. Millimet, Environmental Federalism: A Survey of the
Empirical Literature, CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
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including energy exploration and consumption.20 Energy
development and production is heavily regulated by a suite of
federal environmental laws, including, among others, the CAA,21
the Clean Water Act (CWA),22 and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act.23 State and local governments, nonetheless, retain
their historic authority over most land use and are directly involved
in the regulation of utilities.24
Whereas most early environmental protection measures were
enacted at the state or local level, the federal government has been
actively involved in the regulation of energy since the early part of
the 20th century. In 1920, Congress enacted the Federal Water
Power Act25 (FWPA), which later became Part I of the Federal
Power Act (FPA).26 The FWPA created the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) and provided for the licensing of hydroelectric
projects on navigable waters.27 Fifteen years later, Congress
enacted Part II of the FPA, authorizing the FPC to regulate
wholesale electricity rates,28 followed shortly thereafter by the
Natural Gas Act, authorizing the FPC to regulate rates for
interstate gas pipelines.29 Over time, the FPC’s jurisdiction over
interstate energy markets expanded, and the agency was redubbed
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 1977.30
Subsequent laws encouraged independent power production and
20. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of
Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377 (2005) [hereinafter
Adler, Judicial Federalism].
21. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. 2011)).
22. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)).
23. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k
(2012)).
24. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768
n.30 (1982) (“[R]egulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential state
activity.”).
25. Federal Water Power Act (FWPA), ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–823 (2012)).
26. See Federal Power Act (FPA), Pub. L. No. 71-412, 46 Stat. 797 (1930)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. (2012)).
27. See id. (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 792 (2012)) (creating the
Federal Power Commission). See also id. (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§797a (2012)) (providing for congressional authorization of licenses for
hydroelectric projects).
28. See Federal Power Act, ch. 687, tit. II, 49 Stat. 838 (1935) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
29. See Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 1, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717w (2012)).
30. See 49 U.S.C. § 60502 (2012).
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the development of alternative energy resources.31 In the late
1970s, FERC also began to take steps toward the deregulation of at
least some wholesale energy markets.32
Although the federal government has a significant regulatory
role, much energy regulation occurs at the state level. State
agencies are heavily involved in land use issues related to energy
extraction and development, as are local governments.33 State and
local agencies oversee the siting of facilities and transmission
lines.34 Even where the federal government has assumed a role in
transmission line siting, state agencies retain a prominent role.35
Utility rates and practices are also governed by Public Utility
Commissions (PUCs) in each state.36
In recent years, states have become particularly active in the
regulation of energy for environmental purposes.37 These measures
range from regulating emissions to imposing fees or charges to
encourage the development of less-polluting forms of energy.38
Some state PUCs now require consideration of environmental costs
in the evaluation of new energy projects, and a majority of states

31. See, e.g., Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), Pub. L. No.
95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2602-3211 (2005)). See
also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the
Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 469 (2005).
32. For example, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, enacted as part of the
National Energy Act of 1978, authorized the partial deregulation of natural gas
prices. See 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (2012).
33. In many states, there are legal and policy disputes over the proper
allocation of regulatory authority between the state and local governments. See
generally John R. Nolon & Steven E. Gavin, Hydrofracking: State Preemption,
Local Power, and Cooperative Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 995
(2013).
34. For an examination of the divide between federal and state governments
over transmission siting and its implications for renewable energy, see
Alexandra B. Klass and Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges
for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1827–
31 (2012).
35. See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009).
Note that there is less of a local role in the siting of pipelines.
36. Every state has a PUC. See Regulatory Commissions, NAT’L ASS’N OF
REGULATORY UTIL. COMM’RS, http://www.naruc.org/Commissions/Commis
sionsList.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/VL8X-CWQG (last visited Oct. 8,
2014).
37. See Nathan E. Endrud, Note, State Renewable Portfolio Standards:
Their Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 259, 259–60 (2008).
38. Id. at 260.
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have renewable portfolio standards.39 This degree of state
regulatory activism is not surprising given that state governments
have often enacted environmental regulations in advance of the
federal government.40
Many of the newer measures adopted by state governments
purport to address the threat of global climate change by reducing
the carbon intensity of energy produced or used within the state, or
by otherwise reducing GHG emissions.41 These measures are
prompted, in part, by the federal government’s failure to adopt a
comprehensive climate policy.42 State-level action on climate
change is unlikely, in itself, to have much impact on atmospheric
concentrations of GHGs or projected rates of future warming.43
Nonetheless, the level of state activity is significant and could raise
important constitutional questions about the scope of state
regulatory authority.
One feature—or bug—of some state policies is their attempt to
address the out-of-state effects of in-state energy consumption.
Some states that have adopted renewable portfolio standards, for
example, have sought to privilege in-state renewable power
producers so as to ensure that at least some portion of the
economic benefits from such mandates are captured within the
state.44 For example, in its low-carbon fuel standards, California
has sought to adopt a “lifecycle” approach to energy regulation that
accounts for all of the environmental effects of fuel production,
including the extraction and processing of the relevant energy
source wherever such activities occur.45 California and other states
39. See id. (referring to some states that use “environmental externality
values” in evaluating energy projects). See also id. at 260 n.10 (noting that a
majority of states already have renewable portfolio standards).
40. See, e.g., Elliott et al., supra note 8, at 316; Jonathan H. Adler, The
Fable of Federal Environmental Regulation: Reconsidering the Federal Role in
Environmental Protection, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 93, 96–100 (2004).
41. See Thomas D. Peterson et al., Developing a Comprehensive Approach
to Climate Change Policy in the United States that Fully Integrates Levels of
Government and Economic Sectors, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 227, 239 (2008)
(summarizing state climate initiatives).
42. See, e.g., Engel & Orbach, supra note 6. Some states have also resorted
to litigation in their efforts to spur greater federal action on climate change. See,
e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v.
Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
43. Wiener, supra note 16, at 1963 (noting it is “well understood that these
state-level efforts, even those of large states such as California, will have little
impact on global emissions and hence little impact on global climate.”).
44. See infra Parts III and IV.
45. The purpose of California’s low carbon fuel standard is to reduce GHG
emissions by reducing “full fuel cycle, carbon intensity” of transportation fuel
used in California. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480 (2014). California defines
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have also sought to prevent states from gaining a competitive
advantage due to their regulatory measures.46
Measures addressing the effects of out-of-state energy
production are justified by the need to address carbon “leakage.”47
Specifically, there is a concern that imposing stringent emission
controls or carbon limits in one jurisdiction will have “the
frustrating and perverse effect” of “reducing carbon in one place”
only to make “it pop up somewhere else.”48 In the energy context,
the fear is that imposing costly regulatory measures in one
jurisdiction will induce companies to shift their operations to, or
source energy and other factors of production from, other, lessregulated jurisdictions. If electric utilities in one state are required
to reduce their GHG emissions or derive a larger share of the
electricity they sell from more costly sources, they may be at a
competitive disadvantage against utilities in other jurisdictions.
Regulations limiting the carbon intensity of in-state fuel production
may induce consumers to obtain fuels from out-of-state producers.
Due to the resulting leakage, any benefits resulting from a state’s
efforts to reduce emissions within its own borders may be offset by
an increase in emissions elsewhere. Relatedly, some fear that state
policies to encourage the development of renewable energy will
drive such development to other jurisdictions, potentially leaving
in-state consumers with higher energy bills without the offsetting
economic benefits of in-state development.49
California’s climate efforts are particularly ambitious. In 2006,
California enacted the Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32),
obligating the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to impose,
among other things, a statewide cap-and-trade regime for GHG
emissions and to adopt low-carbon fuel standards for all gasoline
sold within the state.50 Both components of AB 32 have been the

“carbon intensity” to include full “lifecycle” GHG emissions. CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 17, § 95481(a)(16) (2014).
46. See infra Parts III and IV.
47. James W. Coleman, Unilateral Climate Regulation, 38 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 87, 106–14 (2014).
48. Farber, supra note 1, at 37.
49. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate
Change Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 843
(2008) (summarizing the economic risks of leakage).
50. See Assemb. B. 32, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (codified at
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-38599 (2006)).
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subject of significant controversy and litigation, including
constitutional challenges.51
Although California has a history of ambitious environmental
regulation, there are reasons to doubt that states will adopt optimal
environmental policies to address cross-boundary environmental
problems, particularly climate change.52 Climate change is
anything but a local or regional problem. To the contrary, global
climate change is just that—a global environmental concern.53 The
benefits from state or local policies that mitigate the risks posed by
climate change are dispersed globally and cannot be captured
within the enacting jurisdiction. State or local jurisdictions wishing
to combat global climate change are confronted with an archetypal
“commons” problem.54 The global climate is a vast global
commons to which everyone contributes GHG emissions.
Emissions anywhere on the globe contribute to the increase in
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and the eventual warming of
the atmosphere. Any state that reduces emissions within its
jurisdiction will bear the cost of such reductions, but it will not
reap equivalent benefits. Whatever benefits accrue from GHG
emission controls accrue globally.55 No state, acting alone, is
capable of adopting emission controls capable of making a dent in
global emissions, let alone global atmospheric concentrations of
GHGs.56 Even working together, states are not capable of reducing
projected climate change and its anticipated effects to any
meaningful degree.57 As a consequence, states have every
51. See generally Thomas Alcorn, The Constitutionality of California’s
Cap-and-Trade Program and Recommendations for Design of Future State
Programs, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 87 (2013); Peter M. Morrissette &
Robert D. Infelise, A Review of Legal Challenges to California’s Greenhouse
Gas Cap-and-Trade Regulations, 33 WESTLAW J. ENVTL. 18 (2013).
52. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46
DUKE L.J. 931, 932 (1997) (“Given the inherent difficulties in regulation by any
single state, transboundary pollution would seem to present a clear case for
shifting regulatory authority from local to more centralized levels of
governance.”). See generally Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate
Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996); Adler, Mismatch
supra note 19.
53. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN
ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS 10–11 (2001).
54. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI.
1243 (1968) (describing the commons problem).
55. Wiener, supra note 16, at 1965 (“[L]ocal abatement actions pose local
costs, yet deliver essentially no local climate benefits.”).
56. Id. at 1966 (“[N]o state could effectively control its own ambient level
of carbon dioxide or other GHGs, because that ambient level is determined by
the worldwide concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere.”).
57. Id. at 1963.

2014]

CLIMATE BALKANIZATION

163

incentive to “free ride” on the efforts of their neighbors rather than
suffer costs that will yield few internal benefits or to use climate
concerns as a cover for special-interest legislation. However
capable states may be at addressing more localized environmental
concerns, their comparative advantage may end at the border.
There is a mismatch between a state’s capability to comprehend
and control local matters, on the one hand, and the scale of some
transboundary concerns, climate change in particular, on the
other.58
The mismatch between the problem of climate change and
available solutions may explain why some states have adopted
climate-related policies that appear to privilege in-state energy
producers and, where possible, externalize compliance costs to
other jurisdictions. States are more likely to adopt meaningful
emission reductions if they can externalize the costs of such
measures to other jurisdictions and capture the pecuniary benefits.
Such regional rent-seeking has been well documented in
environmental law59 and can occur specifically in the climate
context.60 Consider the various public nuisance lawsuits filed by
state attorney generals against out-of-state firms.61 State officials
who file such suits, get the political benefits of appearing to take
action against climate change without having to bear the costs of
imposing economic burdens on in-state firms. More broadly, state58. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Hothouse Flowers: The Vices and
Virtues of Climate Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 443 (2008)
[hereinafter Adler, Hothouse Flowers].
59. See Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty Profits: Rent-Seeking
Behind the Green Curtain, in POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND
THE GREEN CURTAIN 1, 6–9 (Terry L. Anderson ed. 2000) (summarizing notable
examples of regional rent-seeking in environmental law). For other examples of
rent-seeking in environmental law, see Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental
Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of
Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 898 (1999);
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S.
Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds. 1992).
60. See Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global
Warming Battle, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 207 (2002). Indeed, the “most
ambitious energy and climate-change legislation ever introduced in Congress,”
the American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES), perhaps better known as
the Waxman-Markey Bill, was “fat with compromises, carve-outs, concessions
and out-and-out gifts intended to win the votes of wavering lawmakers and the
support of powerful industries.” John M. Broder, With Something for Everyone,
Climate Bill Passed, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A20.
61. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F.Supp.2d 265
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309, rev’d, 131 S.Ct. 813; California v.
Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
17, 2007).
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level climate policies that benefit in-state firms and constituencies
may be easier to enact than those that produce more dispersed
benefits.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
The United States Constitution constrains the sorts of energy
and environmental policies that may be adopted by both the federal
and state governments.62 The constitutional system of “dual
sovereignty” recognizes the “separate and independent autonomy”
of the states.63 At the same time, this system constrains what states
may do by placing express and implied structural limits on state
authority64 and on the interjurisdictional competition that the
Constitution’s structure creates.
A. Limited and Enumerated Federal Powers
A core component of the constitutional structure is the idea
that the powers of the federal government are limited to those
enumerated in the Constitution itself.65 The bulk of these powers
are enumerated in Article I, section 8.66 These include the powers
to borrow and coin money, establish uniform laws governing
naturalization and bankruptcy, and—most significantly for the
regulation of energy and environmental concerns—the power to
regulate commerce “among the several States.”67 Article I, section
8 also authorizes Congress to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts, and Excises to pay the Debts and provide for the common
62. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 38
(2004) (noting the Constitution’s division of authority “creates obstacles to
states' enacting laws that are more protective of the environment”).
63. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
64. See Erwin Chemerinsky, et al., California, Climate Change and the
Constitution, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10653, 10653 (2007) (“[T]he U.S. Constitution
restricts states’ power to address certain problems and particularly limits the
strategies states can employ to further the interests of their citizens.”).
65. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (“The federal
government ‘is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.’”)
(citation omitted) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405
(1819)). This is not a new proposition. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“The powers of the legislature are defined and limited;
and that those limits may not be mistake, or forgotten, the constitution is
written.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 195 (“The enumeration
presupposes something not enumerated.”).
66. Other powers may be found in the enforcement clauses of the Civil War
Amendments, among other places.
67. U.S. CONST., art. I, §8.
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Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”68 As
interpreted by the courts, this empowers Congress to fund those
projects and programs that Congress believes will advance the
“general Welfare” of the United States.69 Further, the Constitution
also vests Congress with the power to “make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution” the other
powers enumerated in the Constitution.70
Taken together, the powers enumerated in Article I, section 8
grant Congress ample authority to address energy and
environmental concerns. The aforementioned commerce power in
particular is quite expansive. Under current doctrine, the commerce
power (as supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause)
enables Congress to reach nearly all manners of economic
activity.71 As interpreted by the courts, this authority is sufficient
to sustain most federal environmental regulations on the books
today.72 Yet, this authority is not without limits. As the Supreme
Court recently reaffirmed in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, “the National Government possesses only
limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder.”73
Although many federal environmental statutes authorize some
degree of land use regulation, the Supreme Court has been
reluctant to authorize expansive federal regulation in this area. As
the Supreme Court noted in FERC v. Mississippi, the “regulation
of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity.”74 It will not
be subsumed by federal legislation lightly.75

68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 1.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64–65 (1936).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 18.
71. Specifically, under United States v. Lopez, Congress has the authority to
regulate “the use of the channels of interstate commerce,” “the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce,” including persons and things in such commerce, and
“those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” 514 U.S. 549,
558–59 (1995). As applied in Lopez and subsequent cases, Congress may
regulate even rather trivial instances of intra-state economic activity as part of a
broader regulatory scheme governing economic activity. See, e.g., Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
72. See Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 20, at 404–21.
73. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
74. 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982).
75. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715,
737–38 (2006); Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC 558 F.3d 304, 310–12 (4th
Cir. 2009).
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B. Constraints on State Power
The primary constitutional limits on federal power derive from
the delegation of limited and enumerated powers.76 The federal
government only has those powers that are delegated to it. The
states, on the other hand, have all those powers not delegated to the
federal government or constrained by other constitutional
provisions.77 Put another way, whereas the federal government’s
powers are limited and enumerated, the states possess a residual
and plenary police power.78
1. Supremacy Clause
The federal government’s powers are limited, but they are also
supreme. Article VI of the Constitution provides that the federal
Constitution and “the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof” are “the supreme law of the land.”79
Thus, where federal and state laws conflict, federal law prevails.
A consequence of the Supremacy Clause is that the federal
government retains the authority to preempt state regulation of
those matters within the reach of federal regulatory authority.
Preemption may be express or implied.80 Express preemption
occurs when Congress enacts legislation that explicitly overrides or
bars the application of state law.81 Implied preemption, on the
76. Both the federal and state governments are constrained by the Bill of
Rights and the guarantees of the Civil War Amendments as well. With some
exceptions, these limitations do not impose meaningful constraints on energy
and environmental regulation. See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and
the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 421-22
(2005) (discussing Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (stating that
the Constitution “withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power that would
authorize enactment of every type of legislation”).
79. U.S. CONST. art. VI :
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.
80. See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 96, 98 (1992)
(“Pre-emption may be either expressed or implied, and ‘is compelled whether
Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose.’”) (citations omitted) (quoting Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
81. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993).
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other hand, occurs when there is some degree of tension or
incompatibility between federal and state law. This may occur
when a federal statute covers an entire field of law so pervasively
that there is no room for additional state or local regulation—socalled “field preemption”82—or when it is costly, if not impossible,
for a regulated entity to comply with both federal law and state law
simultaneously—so-called “conflict preemption.”83 Courts are
generally reluctant to find preemption without either an express
claim of preemption by Congress, or some other indication of
implied preemption, such as a direct conflict between federal and
state law.84
2. Dormant Commerce Clause
Congress retains the authority to use its enumerated powers to
preempt or limit state laws that conflict with or are otherwise
contrary to federal objectives. Yet even when Congress fails to act,
state laws will be held invalid if they impermissibly burden
interstate commerce. The same Commerce Clause that authorizes
Congress to regulate commerce “among the several states” has also
been interpreted by the courts to constrain state regulation that
unduly interferes with such commerce.85
This “negative” aspect of the Commerce Clause—the so-called
“Dormant Commerce Clause”—is “driven by a concern about
‘economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to
benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors.’”86 As the Supreme Court explained in Granholm v.
Heald, a “central concern” motivating the Constitutional
Convention was the proliferation of state-level barriers impeding
the flow of commerce across state lines.87 The Framers realized
that “in order to succeed the new Union would have to avoid the
tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued
relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the
82. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012).
83. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002).
84. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 533 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part);
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 616
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
85. See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337 (2008)
(“[A]lthough its terms do not expressly restrain ‘the several states’ in any way,
we have sensed a negative implication in the provision since the early days.”).
86. Id. at 337–38 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 273–74 (1988)).
87. 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005).
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Articles of Confederation.”88 Thus, the Supreme Court’s Dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine has evolved to “effectuate[] the
Framers’ purpose to prevent a State from retreating into economic
isolation.”89 Current Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is also
particularly suspicious of extraterritorial legislation, which is
understood as laws that attempt to “control conduct beyond the
boundary of a state.”90 As with the rule against discriminatory state
legislation, this rule operates to limit the potential for “conflicting
legislation.”91
Under current doctrine, state laws that discriminate against outof-state actors are subject to a form of strict scrutiny and are
“virtually per se invalid.”92 States cannot discriminate against outof-state actors or articles of commerce unless there is a “reason,
apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”93 A
discriminatory state law, such as a law that imposes higher taxes or
regulatory burdens on goods produced out-of-state, will only be
upheld if the state can show that the challenged provision
“advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”94 As the
Court has explained, a state may not adopt a discriminatory state
law “if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to
conserve legitimate local interests, are available.”95
Non-discriminatory state laws may be invalidated under the
Dormant Commerce Clause as well. Under the Pike test, named for
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., it is unconstitutional for a state to enact
a law that imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is
“excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”96 For instance,
the Supreme Court has invalidated state laws that unnecessarily
burdened commerce through the state, such as state laws requiring
trucks on state highways to be shorter than those allowed in
neighboring states97 or those requiring a specific type of
88. Id.
89. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330 (1996) (quoting Okla. Tax
Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc. 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995)).
90. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1989).
91. See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347, 358 (1887).
92. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Or. Dep’t. of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99
(1994).
93. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1978).
94. Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 101.
95. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
96. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
97. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 665
(1981). See also S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 763 (1945) (invalidating a
state limit on train length within the state).
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mudguard.98 Both the prohibition of discrimination and the Pike
test operate as default rules that may be altered by Congress
through the exercise of its power to regulate commerce.99
In recognition of the distinction between “[s]tates as market
participants and [s]tates as market regulators,” the Court has
created a “market-participant” exception to the Dormant
Commerce Clause.100 Under this exception, state entities are
permitted to participate in markets, buying and selling goods and
services or providing public goods, in a discriminatory fashion.101
As the Court has explained, “Nothing in the purposes animating
the Commerce Clause prohibits a State . . . from participating in
the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over
others.”102 For instance, a state agency may adopt purchasing
policies that favor in-state businesses or provide services on
preferential terms to in-state residents.
For much of the past two centuries, the Dormant Commerce
Clause has been a powerful check on state regulations that threaten
to burden or constrain interstate commerce.103 The Supreme Court
was particularly aggressive in its enforcement of the Commerce
Clause’s “negative” aspects during the Burger and early Rehnquist
Courts.104 In recent years, however, some Justices on the Supreme
Court have expressed reservations about current Dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine,105 and the Court has taken a
permissive view of state legislation designed to “protect
governmental operations from out-of-state competition.”106 Both
Justices Thomas and Scalia have expressed concerns about the use
of an atextual doctrine to invalidate state laws.107 Concluding the
98. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S 520 (1959).
99. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946)
(rejecting, as against a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge, discriminatory
state insurance regulations authorized by the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
100. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980). See also Hughes v.
Alexandra Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
101. See United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 343 (2007).
102. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 810 (footnote omitted).
103. See Norman R. Williams & Brannon P. Denning, The “New
Protectionism” and the American Common Market, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
247, 248–49 (2013).
104. See Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2003) [hereinafter Klein, Environmental
Commerce Clause].
105. See Williams & Denning, supra note 103, at 292.
106. See id. at 250.
107. See W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 209 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); United Haulers Assn, Inc. v. Oneida-Harkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 349 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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doctrine “has no basis in the Constitution and has proved
unworkable in practice,” Justice Thomas would “discard” it
entirely.108 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, adopts a more
moderate view, agreeing to apply the doctrine “only when stare
decisis compels” him to do so.109 Both of these Justices have also
expressed concern about the Pike test, as it calls for the balancing
of incommensurable values, a task to which neither believes courts
are well suited.110 They may not be alone on the Court, as a
majority of Justices has not struck down a state law on Pike
grounds in over two decades, leading some commentators to
predict the end of the Pike test.111 At the same time, the Court has
appeared to back away from aggressive enforcement of the rule
against extraterritorial legislation.112 If so, the Dormant Commerce
Clause, in the future, may pose less of a threat to state energy
regulation than it has in the past.
III. DORMANT COMMERCE, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
Environmental laws do not get a pass under the Dormant
Commerce Clause. The bar on discriminatory legislation applies
unless, and until, such state measures are authorized by Congress.
The Supreme Court has been quite explicit on this point. In City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, in which the Garden State sought to
defend a prohibition on the import of out-of-state waste, the Court
stressed that “all objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause
protection.”113 This is as true of “goods” (widgets) as it is of
“bads” (waste).114 Environmental claims can be used to mask base
108. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
109. Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 359 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part).
110. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520
U.S. 564, 619 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also United Haulers, 550
U.S. at 348–49 (Scalia, J., concurring).
111. See Williams & Denning, supra note 103, at 304.
112. Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce
Clause: A Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 979 (2013).
113. 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978).
114. See Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause threat to Marketbased Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26
ECOL. L.Q. 243, 244–45 (1999) [hereinafter Engel, Electricity Deregulation]
(“[T]he principle against protectionism in interstate trade applies to all articles
traded in interstate commerce, including those related to the environment.”). See
also Jonathan H. Adler, Waste & the Dormant Commerce Clause – A Reply
(response to Richard Epstein), 3 GREEN BAG 2D 353, 354 (2000).
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economic protectionism.115 Yet even if environmental preservation
were the central purpose of a challenged state law, the Court has
explained, “that would not be sufficient to uphold a discriminatory
regulation.”116
Since 1978, when the Court struck down New Jersey’s ban on
the importation of out-of-state waste,117 the Court has rigorously
applied the Dormant Commerce Clause bar against discriminatory
state legislation to environmental measures whether the laws at
issue concerned water, waste, or something else. Indeed, between
1978 and 2000, the Court invalidated every state law defended on
environmental protection grounds, save one118—a Maine law
prohibiting the importation of out-of-state baitfish.119 Although
discriminatory, Maine’s law survived because the asserted state
interest—preventing the introduction of “parasites and nonnative
species”120 that could threaten local fisheries—could not be readily
addressed through a less discriminatory measure.121 Other
environmental concerns, such as the potential harms from waste
disposal or energy production, are readily addressed through the
direct regulation of such harms, such as through emission controls
and performance standards.122 Such concerns have not been
deemed sufficient to justify discriminatory regulation.123
115. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 279 (1988)
(describing that the legitimate purpose of protecting public health as “merely an
occasional and accidental effect” of the law’s main purpose: economic
protectionism).
116. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 204 (1994).
117. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
118. Klein, Environmental Commerce Clause, supra note 104, at 44 (noting
that “[w]ith only one exception, the Court has invalidated every state law
protecting water or land resources that it has considered between 1978 and the
end of the twentieth century”) (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986)).
While all of these laws may have been defended on environmental protection
grounds, it is not clear whether they all served to enhance environmental
protection. In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, for instance, the
Supreme Court struck down a local solid waste flow control ordinance. 511 U.S.
383, 384 (1994). This decision may have restricted local control over solid
waste, but most major environmental groups also opposed legislative efforts in
Congress to exempt such statutes from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. See
Jonathan H. Adler, The Failure of Flow Control, 18 REG. 11, 13 (1995).
119. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986).
120. Id. at 141.
121. Id. at 151–52.
122. See New Energy Co. of Ind v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)
(finding that “direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run
afoul [of the DCC’s] prohibition . . .”).
123. See generally Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t. Envtl. Quality of Or., 511
U.S. 93 (1994); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383
(1994). See also supra Part II.
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The Court’s record has led some commentators to suggest “the
modern Court has been consistently hostile to environmental
regulation.”124 Given the Supreme Court’s willingness to uphold
environmental laws in other contexts, and its authorization of
expansive federal regulation in Massachusetts v. EPA,125 such a
charge seems unwarranted.126 The Court is hostile to
discriminatory legislation, whatever the context, and has been
unwilling to bend modern Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine just
because environmental protection is at stake.
As already noted, the Court has made clear that the Dormant
Commerce Clause applies to all manners of goods and services. If
the presumptive rule against discriminatory state legislation applies
to waste management services, as the Court has repeatedly held,
there is no reason it would not apply to energy sources or
electricity as well. Indeed, as the Supreme Court held in FERC v.
Mississippi: “It is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of
interstate commerce than electric energy, a product used in
virtually every home and every commercial manufacturing
facility.”127
It is not surprising then that the Supreme Court has applied
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to invalidate state measures
restricting interstate commerce in energy supplies. In New Energy
Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, for example, a unanimous Supreme
Court threw out an Ohio policy favoring in-state ethanol
124. Klein, Environmental Commerce Clause, supra note 104, at 4. Perhaps
ironically, among the Justices most skeptical of the Court’s use of the Dormant
Commerce Clause to invalidate state regulation is the Justice most often accused
of harboring anti-environmental sentiments. See id. at 40–41.
125. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
126. See Stephen M. Johnson, The Roberts Court and the Environment, 37
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 317, 345 (2010); Jonathan H. Adler, Business, the
Environment, and the Roberts Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 49 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 943, 967 (2009). See also EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.,
134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001);
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 118–19 (D.C. Cir. 2010) cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 2959 (2011). Indeed, specifically with regard to the Endangered
Species Act, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to review challenges to
the Endangered Species Act. See Stewart & Jasper Orchards v. Salazar, 638 F.3d
1163 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 498 (2011); Ala.-Tombigbee
Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552
U.S. 1097 (2008); GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323
F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004); Gibbs v.
Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Gibbs v. Norton,
531 U.S. 1145 (2001); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041
(D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
127. 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982).
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producers.128 In 1981, Ohio enacted a statute providing fuel dealers
with tax credits for using ethanol; the tax credits could then be
used against the state’s motor vehicle fuel sales tax.129 In 1984,
Ohio limited the tax credit to the use of ethanol produced in Ohio
or in states that offered a reciprocal tax credit to Ohio-made
ethanol.130 This revision, the Court held, clearly constituted
discriminatory legislation under the Dormant Commerce Clause, as
it “explicitly deprives certain products of available beneficial tax
treatment because they are made in certain other states.”131 That
Ohio only withheld favorable tax treatment and did not seek to
close its borders entirely to ethanol from states without reciprocal
policies was of no consequence. It was sufficient that the law at
issue imposed “an economic disadvantage upon out-of-state
sellers.”132 As Justice Scalia explained in his opinion for the Court:
“Where discrimination is patent, as it is here, neither widespread
advantage to in-state interests nor a widespread disadvantage to
out-of-state competitors need be shown.”133
Ohio sought to defend its policy on the ground that it was not
discriminatory but instead an effort to encourage other states to
provide similarly favorable treatment to ethanol.134 Should all such
states enact such policies, Ohio reasoned, there would be no
discrimination. This was a clever argument, but none of the
Justices bit. As Justice Scalia noted, prior cases had made it quite
clear that a state could not “use the threat of economic isolation to
force sister States” to adopt reciprocal or otherwise favorable
policies.135 Even where states claimed they were seeking to
conserve vital in-state resources, the Court did not shrink from
labeling such laws “facially discriminatory.”136
State regulatory efforts to encourage the use of in-state coal
have not fared much better than Ohio’s in-state ethanol
preferences. In Wyoming v. Oklahoma, the Court threw out an
Oklahoma law mandating that at least ten percent of the coal

128. 486 U.S. 269, 280 (1988).
129. Id. at 272; Act of June 10, 1981, § 1, 1981 Ohio Laws 1693, 1731–32
(codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5735.145 (West 2007)).
130. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 272; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5735.145
(West 2007).
131. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 274.
132. Id. at 275.
133. Id. at 276.
134. Id. at 274.
135. Id. (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 378
(1976)).
136. Id. at 274–75 (citing Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982)).
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burned in coal-fired utilities come from Oklahoma mines.137
Wyoming challenged the law, on behalf of its coal producers, as
Oklahoma utilities had obtained nearly all of their coal from
Wyoming.138 As far as the Court was concerned, this was “not a
close case.”139 A law expressly reserving a portion of the
Oklahoma coal market for Oklahoma coal could not be anything
but protectionist and discriminatory. That only ten percent of the
market was affected was irrelevant: “The volume of commerce
affected measures only the extent of the discrimination; it is of no
relevance to the determination whether a State has discriminated
against interstate commerce.”140 Quoting New Energy Co., the
Court reiterated that where there is such “patent” discrimination,
there is no need to show “widespread advantage to in-state
interests nor a widespread disadvantage to out-of-state interests” to
subject the law to the virtual per se rule of invalidity.141
Following the Supreme Court’s lead in Wyoming v. Oklahoma,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit struck
down efforts by Illinois and Indiana legislators to protect local
production of high-sulfur coal from low-sulfur coal mined in
western states.142 The 1977 CAA Amendments had protected highsulfur coal by mandating the installation of scrubbers in newly
constructed coal-fired power plants.143 This eliminated the
incentive for Midwestern utilities to use low-sulfur coal, as it was
more expensive than the high-sulfur coal, closer to home, and
could no longer be used to satisfy environmental requirements.144
In 1990, however, Congress replaced the scrubber requirement
with a more performance-driven regulatory regime.145 This change
137. 502 U.S. 437, 461 (1992). Justice Thomas dissented, joined by Justice
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, on the grounds that the state of Wyoming
lacked standing to challenge Oklahoma’s law. Id. at 461 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion offered no judgment on the
underlying Dormant Commerce Clause question. Id. at 461–77.
138. Id. at 445.
139. Id. at 455 n.12.
140. Id. at 455.
141. Id. (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276–77
(1988)).
142. See Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller (Alliance I), 44 F.3d 591, 596–97
(7th Cir. 1995); Alliance for Clean Coal v. Bayh (Alliance II), 72 F.3d 556, 560–
61 (7th Cir. 1995).
143. See Alliance I, 44 F.3d at 593. See also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN &
WILLIAM HASSLER, CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR (1981); 1977 Clean Air Act
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 109(e), 91 Stat. 685, 701 (1977).
144. Alliance I, 44 F.3d at 593.
145. See id. See also Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
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made high-sulfur coal more cost competitive and “meant the end of
the salad days for high-sulfur coal-producing states.”146
In response to Congress’s revisions to the CAA, Illinois and
Indiana enacted laws designed to protect in-state coal producers
from low-sulfur coal competition.147 In Illinois, this took the form
of, among other things, requiring the state’s largest power plants to
install scrubbers, guaranteeing that the cost of these scrubbers
could be included in the utilities’ rate base and mandating state
approval before a utility could reduce its use of Illinois coal by
more than ten percent.148 The Seventh Circuit readily concluded
that this form of “encouragement”149 was traditional economic
protectionism in another guise.150 Requiring utilities to install
scrubbers eliminated any incentive to use low-sulfur coal as a
means of complying with relevant air pollution regulations, and
thus had the same economic effect as a tariff on the importation of
such coal from out-of-state.151 Such efforts to protect local industry
“from the rigors of interstate competition,” the court concluded,
were “the hallmark of economic protection that the Commerce
Clause prohibits.”152
Indiana’s effort to protect in-state coal producers was less
aggressive, but no more successful. The Indiana statute subjected
utilities that failed to ensure continued use of Indiana coal to
greater regulatory scrutiny.153 Specifically, it provided that for the
Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission to approve a utility’s plan
to comply with the requirements of the federal CAA, it had to find
that the plan would provide “for continued or increased use of
Indiana coal,” unless this failure could be justified “by economic
considerations including the effects in the regions of Indiana in
which the mining of coal provides employment and in the service
territory of the public utility.”154 As with Illinois’s law, the Seventh
Circuit saw a clear effort to protect in-state producers from out-of146. Alliance I, 44 F.3d at 593.
147. Illinois Coal Act, 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-402.1 (1993); Indiana
Environmental Compliance Plans Act IND. CODE §§ 8-1-27-1 to 8-1-27-23
(1991).
148. Alliance I, 44 F.3d at 594.
149. See id. at 599. See also Alliance I, 44 F.3d at 596 (referring to Illinois’
argument that the Illinois law was merely encouraging local industry
throughout).
150. Alliance I, 44 F.3d at 595–96.
151. Id. at 595.
152. Id. at 596 (quoting W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 205
(1994)).
153. See Alliance for Clean Coal v. Bayh (Alliance II), 72 F.3d 556, 558 (7th
Cir. 1995). See also IND. CODE § 8-1-27-8 (2001).
154. Alliance II, 72 F.3d at 558; IND. CODE § 8-1-27-8(1) (1991).
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state competition. That the law may have been less rigid was of no
consequence, as it still discriminated “against interstate commerce
based solely on geographic origin.”155 As the court explained:
While we do not doubt that a healthy Indiana mining
industry and a fully employed workforce may aid Indiana
in achieving a low cost electrical service, that is not a
legitimate justification for discrimination against interstate
commerce. Protection of local, or even regional, industry is
simply not a legislative action that is consistent with the
Commerce Clause.156
Insofar as the Illinois or Indiana legislatures desired to aid in-state
coal producers, they could not use discriminatory legislation to
achieve this end.157
Restrictions on energy exports are no more permissible than
limitations on imports. Thus, in 1982, the Court invalidated a
decision by the New Hampshire Public Utility Commission (PUC)
denying a utility the permission to sell hydroelectric power
generated within the state to out-of-state customers.158 The New
England Power Company (NEPC) was a regional utility that
operated several hydroelectric generating stations in New
Hampshire.159 Because the state’s largest electric utility, the Public
Service Company of New Hampshire, had higher generating costs,
the PUC concluded that if NEPC were required to sell all of its instate hydroelectric power within New Hampshire, it would reduce
local electric rates.160 Such a requirement is impermissible, the
Court concluded, because the Dormant Commerce Clause
“precludes a state from mandating that its residents be given a
preferred right of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural
resources located within its borders or to the products derived
therefrom.”161 Hydroelectric power, like widgets or waste disposal
services, is a “privately owned article[] of trade” beyond the reach
155. Alliance II, 72 F.3d at 560.
156. Id.
157. A somewhat milder effort to encourage the use of in-state coal by the
Commonwealth of Virginia fared better against legal challenge, albeit in state
court. See Appalachian Voices v. State Corp. Comm’n, 675 S.E.2d 458 (Va.
2009). Although one might argue the Virginia statute was not as overtly
discriminatory, the law does appear to favor facilities that use in-state coal in the
regulatory process, so it is not clear that this statute is readily distinguishable
from the laws invalidated in the two Alliance for Clean Coal cases.
158. New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 344 (1982).
159. Id. at 333–34.
160. Id. at 336.
161. Id. at 338.
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of such protectionist legislation.162 Although Congress retains the
authority to authorize such restrictions, states may not enact such
trade restrictions on their own. Similarly, under the market
participant exception, a state could construct or acquire its own
hydroelectric facilities and operate them for the benefit of state
residents or simply provide subsidies for desired energy sources
from its budget.163 Again, however, it cannot achieve this goal
through the regulation of private actors.
Some state and local governments have adopted laws
restricting the through traffic of energy sources, including coal.164
Such policies, even if not preempted by federal laws governing
transportation, may also run afoul of the Dormant Commerce
Clause. As noted above, the Pike test prohibits state laws that
impose a disproportionate burden on interstate commerce in
relation to any putative local benefits.165 Under this test, laws that
have the purpose or effect of obstructing the transportation of fuel
sources through a state would be suspect, unless they could be
justified as necessary to protect identifiable local concerns. Most
suits challenging these sorts of restrictions, however, have been
162. Id.
163. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)
(“Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul [of the
DCC’s] prohibition . . .”).
164. See, e.g., Tom Lochner et al., Richmond, Berkeley councils vote to
oppose transport of highly flammable crude oil through the East Bay, CONTRA
COSTA T IMES (Mar. 26, 2014, 4:17 PM), http://www.contracostatimes.com
/news/ci_25426813/richmond-berkeley-councils-vote-oppose-transport-highlyflammable, archived at http://perma.cc/CR5K-B3EK; Edward McAllister, New
U.S. West Coast energy projects face tough opposition, REUTERS (March 25,
2014, 9:29 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/25/us-usa-energywest-coast-idUSBREA2O09M20140325, archived at http://perma.cc/RM6HWUC3; Jeff Shuttleworth, Berkeley City Council Votes to Oppose Plan to
Transport Dangerous Crude Oil Through City, THE BERKELEY DAILY PLANET
(Mar. 24, 2014, 5:21 PM), http://www.berkeleydailyplanet.com/issue/2014-0321/article/41952?headline=Berkeley-City-Council-Votes-to-Oppose-Plan-toTransport-Dangerous-Crude-Oil-Through-City--By-Jeff-Shuttleworth, archived
at http://perma.cc/6U28-9N53; Jessica Knoblauch, Coast-To-Coast Opposition
to Exporting Dirty Energy, EARTHJUSTICE (Mar. 13, 2014), http://earthjustice
.org/blog/2014-march/coast-to-coast-opposition-to-exporting-dirty-energy,
archived at http://perma.cc/BQT3-5GNT; Scott Learn, Portland City Council
Passes Resolution Against Coal Trains, THE OREGONIAN (Sept. 19, 2012, 8:34
PM), http://blog.oregonlive.com/environment_impact/print.html?entry=/2012/09
/portland_city_council_passes_r.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HDG9T3WY; Nicholas K. Geranios, Environmental Groups Upset About Coal Trains,
THE SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 26, 2011, 12:21 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html
/localnews/2016612084_apwacoaltrainsspokane1stldwritethru.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/Q7UM-RYXA.
165. See supra Part II.B.2.

178

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. 3

resolved without reaching the constitutional question.166 The
Federal Railway Safety Act, for instance, preempts state and local
laws that obstruct or burden interstate rail traffic, providing courts
with a statutory basis for invalidating such state policies.167 Yet
even if such laws are not preempted, they could still be struck
down.
IV. VULNERABLE STATE ENERGY POLICIES
States have enacted a wide range of policies designed to reduce
the adverse environmental consequences of energy production and
encourage greater use of renewable or low-carbon energy sources.
Many of these policies, including direct subsidies to alternative
energy producers and regulations directly controlling pollution or
other environmental harms, are perfectly constitutional. Other
policies, however, including some renewable portfolio standards
and California’s low-carbon fuel standards, may run afoul of
current Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.168
A. Renewable Portfolio Standards
Over the past decade, a majority of states has adopted a
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) to encourage the use of
renewable energy sources and reduce GHG emissions.169 An RPS,
sometimes referred to as a “Renewable Electricity Standard” or
RES, is a requirement that utilities and other retail sellers of
electricity source a minimum percentage of their power from a
defined set of “renewable” sources.170 Under existing programs,
166. See, e.g., Duluth, Winnipeg, & Pac. Ry. Co. v. City of Orr, 529 F.3d
794 (8th Cir. 2008) (local law limiting speed of trains passing through
jurisdiction preempted by Federal Railway Safety Act); CSX Trans., Inc. v.
Williams, 406 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (local law prohibiting transportation of
hazardous materials through district preempted by Federal Railroad Safety Act).
167. See Duluth, Winnipeg, & Pac. Ry. Co. 529 F.3d at 799–800; CSX
Trans., 406 F.3d at 673.
168. See Lee & Duane, supra note 12, at 313–53; Coleman, supra note 1.
169. See Endrud, supra note 37 (noting that a majority of states already have
renewable portfolio standards). “Indeed, [by 2012,] thirty states and the District
of Columbia had adopted an RPS . . .” Lee & Duane, supra note 12, at 298. See
also Neal J. Cabral, The Role of Renewable Portfolio Standards in the Context
of a National Carbon-Cap-and-Trade Program, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL’Y 13, 13 (2007) (noting that the “primary perceived benefit” of RPS
programs is a reduction in GHG emissions).
170. See Anne Havemann, Surviving the Commerce Clause: How Maryland
Can Square Its Renewable Energy Laws with the Federal Constitution, 71 MD.
L. REV. 848, 858 (2012) (describing state renewable energy laws). See also id. at
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the minimum amount of renewable power required ranges from
4% to 30%.171 Some programs impose a minimum requirement
that is scheduled to increase over time.172 RPS requirements are
necessary to induce greater use of renewable power because
renewable power tends to be significantly more expensive than
nonrenewable alternatives.173 RPS proponents hope that requiring
the greater use of renewable power sources will boost the market
for renewable power and help bend the renewable cost curve
downward.174
Iowa enacted the first state RPS in 1983.175 It would be more
than ten years before another state (Nevada) would follow.176 After
the turn of the century, however, RPSs began to proliferate. There
were seven state RPSs in 2002,177 and 28 by 2009, accounting for
approximately 50% of the electricity load in the United States.178
By January 2012, the Energy Information Administration reported
that 30 states and the District of Columbia had enacted enforceable
RPS laws, and another seven states had adopted non-binding
renewable portfolio goals.179 Some proponents of renewable power
hope that the adoption of state-level RPS standards might

885 n.3 (citing state renewable energy laws called both renewable energy
standards and renewable portfolio standards).
171. See FRED BOSSELMAN, ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 877 (3d. ed. 2010).
172. See California Renewable Energy Overview and Programs, CAL.
ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/, archived at
http://perma.cc/9Y6Y-Z7XV (last visited Oct. 8, 2014) (providing a timeline of
the California RPS and noting an increase in the California RPS’s target
percentage from 20% of retail sales to 33% of retail sales by 2020); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(I)(E) (2010) (increasing the Colorado RPS’s target
percentage from 20% of retail sales to 30% of retail sales by 2020).
173. Endrud, supra note 37, 263. (“[T]he very fact that such programs must
be imposed by state regulators suggests the obvious—that electrical power
usually cannot be produced as inexpensively from renewable sources as it can be
from nonrenewable sources.”).
174. See Engel, supra note 114, at 262. (“Renewable portfolio standards are
designed to make renewables competitive with other sources of energy in the
long run.”) (footnote omitted).
175. See Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National
RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1357 (2010).
176. See Jeremiah I. Williamson & Matthias L. Sayer, Federalism in
Renewable Energy Policy, 27 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 19, 20 (2012).
177. See Endrud, supra note 37, at 262–63.
178. See BOSSELMAN, supra note 171, at 875.
179. See Most states have Renewable Portfolio Standards, ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850,
archived at http://perma.cc/7TZ7-N56S.
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eventually spur the adoption of a federal RPS standard.180 Thus far,
legislation to create a federal RPS has been proposed, but not yet
adopted.181
In a typical RPS program, electricity retailers may produce the
electricity themselves or purchase qualifying renewable electricity
from other producers or wholesalers.182 Under most RPS programs,
retailers may also purchase tradable renewable energy credits (also
known as renewable energy certificates or RECs) to fulfill their
RPS obligations.183 The use of RECs facilitates the development of
renewable power by, among other things, relieving renewable
power producers “from the need to deliver the renewable
electricity in real time to the ultimate users.”184 The use of RECs
can also lower the costs of complying with RPS requirements.185
“RECs have become the dominant mechanism of RPS
compliance.”186
Different states have adopted different definitions for what
constitutes “renewable” power, as well as what qualifies as an
REC, how long the credits last, and whether they may be
“banked.”187 Solar, wind, biomass, and gas captured from landfills
typically qualify as renewable power sources under state RPS
programs.188 In some states, the RPS also includes a specified
“carve-out” that must be filled with solar power.189 Other sources
180. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal
Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1533–38
(2007) (citing examples of state efforts to encourage federal action). See also
Lee & Duane, supra note 12, at 354 (arguing for a federal RPS as an alternative
to protect vulnerable RPS policies).
181. For an explanation for why a national RPS has not passed, and is
unlikely to be enacted in the near future, see Jim Rossi, The Shaky Political
Economy Foundation of a National Renewable Electricity Requirement, 2011 U.
ILL. L. REV. 361 (2011).
182. See Havemann, supra note 170, at 858–60.
183. Id.
184. K.S. CORY & B.G. SWEZEY, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS IN
THE STATES: BALANCING GOALS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES, NAT'L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. 3 (2007), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs
/fy08osti/41409.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4QPJ-L3TW.
185. Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong:
The Case for a National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications for
Policy, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 85, 138–39 (2008).
186. CORY & SWEZEY, supra note 184.
187. Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle With Care: The
Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX.
J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 59, 65–66 (2012).
188. See id. at 65. See also RPS Data, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR
RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/rpsdata/index.cfm,
archived at http://perma.cc/9EDH-TQAS (last visited Oct. 8, 2014).
189. Ferrey, supra note 187, at 67.
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of renewable power, such as tidal power and municipal waste, only
qualify in some states.190 Some sources of power that are not
typically considered to be renewable, nonetheless, qualify under
some state programs. Pennsylvania, for example, has a particularly
capacious definition of what constitutes “renewable power,”
counting fossil fuel gasification, distributed generation from nonrenewable sources, and co-generation.191
Many states have adopted definitions of “renewable” power in
their RPS programs that privilege in-state producers.192 These instate privileges can take many forms. Massachusetts, for example,
created an RPS Solar Carve-Out requiring a minimum percentage
of the RPS requirement to be filled with power generated from
newly-constructed, in-state solar photovoltaic projects.193 Four
other states—California, Colorado, North Carolina, and Ohio—
limit the portion of their RPS that may be met with out-of-state
power.194 Other states privilege in-state producers by adopting
REC “multipliers” for in-state producers, under which the volume
of credits from renewable power generation is greater for in-state
producers.195 Still, others provide multipliers or preferences for instate producers that utilize in-state labor or in-state materials.196
Some states also adopt regional preferences, privileging producers
in a given region, such as those defined by a regional transmission
organization, rather than a single state.197 Only seven states with
RPS programs lack any in-state or geographically-defined
preference.198
In-state production requirements are sometimes justified as an
attempt to offset some of the economic costs of mandating the
190. Id. at 65.
191. Pennsylvania’s list of eligible power sources includes:
Solar Water Heat, Solar Space Heat, Solar Thermal Electric, Solar Thermal
Process Heat, Photovoltaics, Landfill Gas, Wind, Biomass, Hydroelectric,
Geothermal Electric, Fuel Cells, Geothermal Heat Pumps, Municipal Solid
Waste, CHP/Cogeneration, Waste Coal, Coal Mine Methane, Coal
Gasification, Anaerobic Digestion, Fuel Cells using Renewable Fuels,
Other Distributed Generation Technologies.
See Pennsylvania Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, DATABASE OF
STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=PA06R&re=0&e
e=0, archived at http://perma.cc/G42D-Z9FC.
192. See Ferrey, supra note 187.
193. Id. at 67. Other types of geographic restrictions include requirements
that eligible RECs be sold to in-state consumers. Id. at 69.
194. Id. at 74–75.
195. Id. at 72–73.
196. Id. at 79.
197. Ferrey, supra note 187, at 114–22.
198. Id. at 79.
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purchase of more expensive renewable power by providing local
economic benefits.199 It is also likely that the adoption of
preferences for in-state renewable power has facilitated the passage
of RPS programs by providing benefits to concentrated in-state
economic interests. In this regard, at least some state RPS
requirements may be seen as the result of the sort of “Baptist and
Bootlegger” coalition common in environmental policy.200
Whatever the purported justification of such requirements,
policies privileging in-state renewable power sources raise obvious
Dormant Commerce Clause problems and have already been
challenged in federal court.201 As noted above, courts have readily
struck down state regulations that privilege in-state power over
out-of-state alternatives.202 In 2010, Transcanada Power Marketing
sued the Commonwealth of Massachusetts over its RPS, and
Massachusetts promptly settled, avoiding a potentially adverse
court judgment.203 Other litigation against allegedly discriminatory
RPS programs is ongoing.204 Whatever the justification, there is
little question that limitations on the use of out-of-state power to
satisfy a state’s RPS requirement qualify as discriminatory
199. See Endrud, supra note 37, at 264 (“These economic benefits, namely
the jobs and commercial revenue created by construction and operation of new
renewable energy generation facilities, can at least partially offset RPS
programs’ overall costs to state citizens.”). Although such requirements may
offset some of the economic costs of imposing an RPS, it is rare that the
economic benefits will rival the economic costs of the program. See ANDREW P.
MORRISS ET AL., THE FALSE PROMISE OF GREEN ENERGY (2011).
200. On the “Baptist and Bootlegger” phenomenon, in general, see Bruce
Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists-The Education of a Regulatory Economist, 7
REG. 12 (1983); Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect: The
Marriage of High-Flown Values and Narrow Interests Continues To Thrive, 22
REG. 5 (1999). See also Yandle & Buck, supra note 60.
201. See Ferrey, supra note 187; Klass & Henley, Energy Policy, supra note
12. See also Lee & Duane, supra note 12.
202. See supra Part III.
203. Partial Settlement Agreement, MA. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY ENVTL.
AFFAIRS (2010), http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/renewables/solar/settle
ment-agreement.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7T3J-5K2E; Michael Flett,
Massachusetts and TransCanada Reach Partial Settlement, FLETTEXCHANGE
(June 3, 2010), http://markets.flettexchange.com/2010/06/03/massachusetts-andtranscanada-reach-partial-settlement/, archived at http://perma.cc/JC83-2T2G.
204. Ferrey, supra note 187, at 137–42. In particular, on May 9, 2014, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado summarily dismissed, among
other things, a broad Dormant Commerce Clause challenge against Colorado’s
RES. Energy & Env't Legal Inst. v. Epel, No. 11-cv-00859-WJM-BNB, 2014
WL 1874977 (D. Colo. May 9, 2014). Appellate review is forthcoming. Press
Release, Energy & Env’t Legal Inst., Colorado RES Decision Paves Way for
10th District Appeal (May 9, 2014), available at http://eelegal.org/?p=2972,
archived at http://perma.cc/C4UH-2H7A.
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measures. As Judge Richard Posner summarily concluded in a
recent decision, a state may not “discriminate against out-of-state
renewable energy,” such as by refusing to credit renewable energy
produced out-of-state toward a state-based RPS.205
Lower courts appear to share Judge Posner’s view. In April
2014, a federal district court in Minnesota invalidated portions of
Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act, which sought to limit
increases in “statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions” by
barring utilities from importing electricity from out-of-state coalfired power plants.206 Minnesota’s policy, the court concluded, was
impermissibly extraterritorial because it effectively regulated outof-state transactions.207 This result was unavoidable because the
electricity grid “does not recognize state boundaries” and, because
of the nature of the electricity grid, the law would restrict
electricity contracts between out-of-state producers and
consumers.208
If states are not allowed to discriminate against out-of-state
coal or ethanol producers, there is little reason to suspect they can
discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy producers.
Advocates of such policies argue that states adopting in-state
preferences, such as limits on the use of out-of-state RECs, are
“guilty of nothing more than trying to ensure clean air in an
efficient manner.”209 Yet, if the goal is to ensure “clean air” in the
most efficient manner possible, the state policy would focus on
emissions directly, rather than rely upon the development of
alternative energy sources as a proxy. As the courts have held in
other contexts, environmental concerns justify environmental
measures, not discriminatory measures against out-of-state
actors.210
The Dormant Commerce Clause, as traditionally enforced,
should prevent states from adopting facially discriminatory RPS
policies. Whatever the merits of RPS policies generally,211 the
205. See Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 721
F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014).
206. See North Dakota v. Heydinger, No. 11-CV-3232 (SRN/SER), 2014
WL 1612331, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 18, 2014).
207. Id. at *22–23.
208. Id.
209. See Engel, supra note 114, at 246.
210. Indeed, as stated in Or.Waste Sys. Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality,
discrimination “simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.” 511 U.S. 93,
99 (1994). Accordingly, “the purpose of, or justification for, a law has no
bearing on whether it is facially discriminatory.” Id. at 100.
211. However, RPSs are not without their critics. Professor Robert Michaels
is particularly vocal in his opposition to RPSs. Professor Michaels argues that
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interests they serve can be advanced through non-discriminatory
measures. Clever states, however, may find ways to define the
relevant requirements in a facially neutral manner that nonetheless
inures to the benefit of in-state interests.212 For example, it may be
possible to define eligible renewable energy sources in ways that
take advantage of a state’s comparative advantages, perhaps due to
unique geographic or other features.213 Yet, if states are too
aggressive in this regard, the policies could nonetheless fall to
Dormant Commerce scrutiny should courts recognize such policies
as having the “purpose or effect” of discriminating against out-ofstate actors.214
If the goal of RPS programs is to encourage the production of
renewable energy and reduce energy-related pollution, including
pollution caused by the emission of GHGs, these interests are
readily advanced through non-discriminatory legislation. The
problem for states, however, may be that many of these benefits
extend beyond state boundaries, and are thus not readily captured
within the state. This “mismatch” between the costs of such
programs—which will fall upon in-state consumers—and their
benefits, which will be dispersed—could make it difficult to enact
RPS laws at the state level.215 While the use of discriminatory

RPSs are inefficient and will “reduce[] emissions at [a] higher cost than
necessary.” Robert J. Michaels, National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Smart
Policy or Misguided Gesture?, 29 ENERGY L.J. 79, 81 (2008). After all,
constraining different forms of energy does not mean constraining emissions.
Requiring a higher percentage of renewables will lead to the displacement of
more costly forms of energy, like natural gas, rather than the less costly forms of
energy, like coal, which yield relatively more emissions. Id. at 86–87. Further,
RPSs often ignore the possibility of efficiency improvements, which are a less
costly option and can reduce just as much pollution as renewables. Id. at 87–88.
With regard to a federal RPS, Professor Michaels argues a federal RPS would be
inequitable, a byproduct of self-serving politics. Under a federal RPS, states
lacking in renewable energy resources will be forced to buy energy and RECs
from renewable-rich states, merely amounting to a transfer of wealth between
states. Id. at 91–92.
212. See Carolyn Elefant & Edward A. Holt, State RPS Policy Report: The
Commerce Clause and Implications for State Renewable Portfolio Standard
Programs, CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALLIANCE 14–15 (2011), http://www.cesa
.org/assets/Uploads/CEG-Commerce-Clause-paper-031111-Final.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/A2M5-LMDU.
213. Many New England states have been able to effectively exclude cheap
Canadian hydropower from their respective RPSs by setting limitations on the
construction date and the qualifying size of the hydroelectric projects. See
Coleman, supra note 1.
214. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984).
215. See generally Adler, Hothouse Flowers, supra note 58.
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provisions may help explain why so many states have enacted RPS
policies, not all states have resorted to such measures.
B. California Low-Carbon Fuel Standard
California has long been a leader in the enactment of
environmental policies. Throughout the post-WWII period,
California has adopted environmental regulations in advance of
most other states, as well as the federal government, often inspiring
imitators or spurring federal action.216 This is true in the context of
energy and climate policy as well. California has not only adopted
an RPS, it has also enacted a wide-ranging climate bill, AB 32,
which requires the imposition of a stationary source cap-and-trade
regime and controls on the carbon content of fuels.217 While all of
these measures are somewhat controversial, the latter has raised
particularly challenging Dormant Commerce Clause concerns.
As noted above, in 2006 California enacted AB 32—the Global
Warming Solutions Act. Concluding that “[g]lobal warming poses
a serious threat to the economic well-being, public health, natural
resources, and environment of California,”218 the California
legislature resolved to reduce the state’s GHG emissions to 1990
levels by the year 2020.219 As part of this effort, the law instructed
the California Air Resource Board (CARB) to enact regulations to
reduce GHG emissions from the transportation sector,220 which is
alone responsible for an estimated 40% of the state’s GHG
emissions.221
CARB pursued its mission with three measures. First, CARB
adopted a series of GHG emission standards for new motor
vehicles, something regulators in California alone are permitted to
do.222 Second, CARB sought to reduce annual vehicle miles
traveled through a series of planning and land use measures.223
216. See supra note 2 and sources cited therein.
217. Assemb. B. 32, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (codified
at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-38599 (2006)).
218. Id. at 2.
219. Id. at 6 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38550–38599
(2006)).
220. Id. at 1.
221. Climate Change Scoping Plan, CAL. AIR RES. BD. 66, 69 (Dec. 2008), http:
//www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/adopted_scoping_plan.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/T7YR-SX53.
222. See Jonathan H. Adler, Hothouse Flowers: The Vices and Virtues of
Climate Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 443, 464 n.86 (2008).
223. See generally Joanna D. Malaczynski & Timothy P. Duane, Reducing
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Vehicle Miles Traveled: Integrating the
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Third, and most significantly for this article, CARB adopted fuel
standards to reduce the overall carbon content of transportation
fuels used within the state.224 Specifically, CARB imposed a
declining annual cap on the average carbon intensity of
transportation fuels sold within the state.225 As with an RPS,
regulated entities may comply themselves or acquire credits to
satisfy their regulatory requirements.226 Thus, each fuel blender
must ensure that the average carbon intensity of its fuel remains
below the annual limit, either by blending fuels with a lower
carbon content or by acquiring credits from other regulated entities
that have exceeded their regulatory requirements.
Because GHGs emitted anywhere have the same effect on the
atmosphere, CARB elected to use a “lifecycle analysis” to
determine the carbon intensity of transportation fuels.227 That is,
the carbon intensity of a given transportation fuel is determined by
the aggregate amount of carbon dioxide-equivalent that is emitted
through the “lifecycle” of the fuel—from its initial extraction or
production to its eventual combustion in a vehicle and everything
in between, including any processing or transporting of the fuel.228
“Without lifecycle analysis, all GHGs emitted before the fuel
enters a vehicle’s gas tank would be excluded from California’s
regulation.”229 By the same token, a fuel standard that focuses on
in-state emissions could fail to account for low-carbon production
processes or transportation methods. As a consequence, failure to
account for the lifecycle of transportation fuels could cause
California’s regulations to actually increase the very emissions it is
seeking to control.
By seeking to account for emissions generated out-of-state,
CARB’s low-carbon fuel standards immediately raise a red flag
under the Dormant Commerce Clause. On its face, such a
requirement would appear to be an impermissible extraterritorial
regulation. In addition, CARB implemented its fuel standards in
ways that appear to be facially discriminatory and trumpeted these

California Environmental Quality Act with the California Global Warming
Solutions Act, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 71 (2009).
224. CAL.CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–90 (2011).
225. Id. at § 95482.
226. Id. at § 95845.
227. Id. at § 95846.
228. “CARB designed the Fuel Standard to account for emissions associated
with all aspects of the production, refining, and transportation of a fuel, with the
aim of reducing total, well-to-wheel GHG emissions.” Rocky Mountain Farmers
Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013).
229. See id.
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effects when promulgating its rules. In making the case for its own
rules, CARB determined that reducing the volume of fuels
imported from other states would, itself, advance the state’s
regulatory goals, and CARB explained how encouraging the
construction of in-state biorefineries would increase California’s
tax base and increase local employment.230
In order to determine the carbon intensity of a given fuel,
CARB adopted a model developed at the Argonne National
Laboratory, Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy
Use in Transportation (GREET), that estimates the lifecycle carbon
intensity of a fuel based on its type, the feedstock used, the source
of energy used during processing, method of transportation to
market, and so on.231 This model generates a default value used for
determining a fuels’ carbon intensity, though individual producers
retain the ability to propose an alternative, individualized
assessment at their own expense.232 Not only does this model
effectively penalize fuels for being transported—by incorporating
the energy used in such transportation as part of the carbon
intensity value—but it also adopts default values based upon the
location of where a given fuel is produced.
In the case of ethanol, CARB attributes greater carbon intensity
to the production of ethanol in the Midwest than to the production
of ethanol in California because Midwestern utilities use more coal
than do California utilities.233 On the other hand, because it is more
costly (and energy intensive) to transport the crops used to produce
ethanol than to transport ethanol itself, Midwestern ethanol is
benefitted insofar as it is produced closer to the source of the crops
than is California ethanol.234 The end result of accounting for
geographic location, however, appears to benefit California
producers: “California’s combination of more efficient plants and
greater access to low-carbon electricity outweighs Midwest
ethanol’s lower transportation emissions.”235
In the case of crude oil, CARB crafted its regulations so as to
try to encourage the use of alternative fuels.236 Here again,
however, state regulators adopted measures that appear
discriminatory in that they advantage at least some in-state
230. California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard: Final Statement of Reasons,
CAL. AIR RES. BD. 479 (2009), http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2009/lcfs09
/lcfsfsor.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/EZ8V-XVAB.
231. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1081–82.
232. Id. at 1082.
233. Id. at 1083.
234. Id. at 1083–84.
235. Id. at 1084.
236. Id. at 1085.
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producers. First, CARB divided crude oil sources as “existing” or
“emerging” based upon whether they already served the California
market.237 CARB also divided crude sources into High Carbon
Intensity Crude Oil (HCICO) and Non-HCICO.238 All existing
crude oil sources were assigned the average carbon intensity value
for all crude oil in 2006.239 This intensity was also assigned to
emerging Non-HCICO.240 For emerging HCICO sources, all of
which could be assumed to have carbon intensities at least as high
as the 2006 average, their actual carbon intensity will be used.241
Out-of-state producers challenged CARB’s regulatory
standards in 2009, and at the time of this writing, the litigation is
still ongoing.242 In Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, a
district court judge held that portions of CARB’s low-carbon fuel
standards were impermissibly discriminatory.243 Specifically, the
court found that the standard “impermissibly discriminates against
out-of-state corn ethanol and impermissibly regulates
extraterritorially,” and issued a preliminary injunction barring
enforcement of the standard.244 The district court also held that
while CARB’s crude oil regulations were not facially
discriminatory, they were discriminatory in purpose and effect.245
On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the ethanol
provisions were neither facially discriminatory nor impermissibly
extraterritorial, but the court also remanded the case for
consideration of whether the ethanol provisions had the purpose or
effect of discriminating and, if not, whether the ethanol rules were
unduly burdensome on interstate commerce in violation of the Pike
237. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1085.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. Note: After these provisions were challenged in federal court, CARB
revised these regulations, effective January 2012. “Under the new system, all
crude oil is assessed the same carbon intensity value, either the average of the
California market in the year of sale or the average from 2010, whichever is
higher.” Id. at 1086.
242. Corey, 730 F.3d. at 1107 (remanding the case for consideration of
whether the ethanol provisions had the purpose or effect of discriminating and,
if not, whether the ethanol rules withstand the Pike balancing test).
243. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene (Rocky Mountain
Ethanol), 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079 (E.D. Cal. 2011), rev'd in part sub nom.
See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1070.
244. Id. at 1078–79.
245. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene (Rocky Mountain Crude),
Nos. CV–F–09–2234 LJO DLB, CV–F–10–163 LJO DLB, 2011 WL 6934797,
at *12–14 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2011), rev'd in part sub nom. Corey, 730 F.3d
1070.
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test.246 One of the judges on the panel dissented in part, concluding
that the ethanol provisions were facially discriminatory in that the
carbon intensity of ethanol fuels sold in California are expressly a
function of where that ethanol is produced.247 The Ninth Circuit
also unanimously reversed the district court’s conclusion that the
crude oil standards were discriminatory in purpose or effect.248
The district court and dissenting judge on the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the ethanol regulations were facially discriminatory
because the table delineating the carbon intensity of different
ethanol production processes expressly relied upon the location of
production as a factor in determining its carbon intensity.249 “It is
not necessary to look beyond the text of the statute to determine
that it discriminates against interstate commerce,” the Supreme
Court explained in Camps/Newfound Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison.250 Relying upon this admonition, Judges O’Neill and
Murguia simply looked at the relevant rules and found an
impermissible location-based constraint.251 For instance, Table 6
assigned different default carbon intensity values to Midwestern
and California ethanol producers utilizing the same production
processes.252 As Judge Murguia wrote in her dissent on the Ninth
Circuit, “Table 6 differentiates between in-state and out-of-state
ethanol, according more preferential treatment to the former at the
expense of the latter.”253
The Ninth Circuit majority saw things differently and stressed
“the grave need in this context for state experimentation.”254
Assigning different carbon intensity values to fuels produced in
different locations would not be discriminatory, the majority
concluded, if there was “some reason, apart from their origin, to
treat them differently.”255 If, as the Supreme Court suggested in
Oregon Waste Systems v. Department of Environmental Quality,256
a state could charge a differential fee for the disposal of out-ofstate waste if such waste “did impose higher costs” on the disposal
246. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1107.
247. Id. at 1107–10 (Murguia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
248. Id. at 1107.
249. Rocky Mountain Ethanol, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1089; Corey, 730 F.3d at
1108 (Murguia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
250. 520 U.S. 564, 575–76 (1997).
251. Rocky Mountain Ethanol, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1086; Corey, 730 F.3d at
1108.
252. Rocky Mountain Ethanol, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1088.
253. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1108.
254. Id. at 1097.
255. Id. at 1089 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
627 (1978)).
256. 511 U.S. 93.
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state, then it should be permissible for California to penalize more
carbon-intensive, out-of-state fuels if they are, in fact, more carbon
intensive.257 “California’s reasonable decision to use regional
categories in its default pathways and in the text of Table 6 does
not transform its evenhanded treatment of fuels based on their
carbon intensities into forbidden discrimination.”258
Both the district court and dissenting judges accepted that
California had a legitimate local purpose in adopting its
regulations—addressing the threat of climate change259—but
concluded California had less discriminatory means of addressing
this concern, such as by conducting individualized lifecycle
assessments for different fuel producers, instead of relying upon
location-based default values.260 Such an alternative may have
been “more difficult or costly,” but it would also not have been
facially discriminatory.261
An alternative approach may have made California’s rules
facially neutral to satisfy the district court and dissenting judges,
but the potential problems of extraterritoriality and discriminatory
effect would have remained. In calculating the carbon intensity of
different ethanol sources, California not only considered the
emissions directly resulting from each stage of the production
process, but also those from the indirect emissions generated by,
for example, anticipated changes in land use resulting from
demand for crops to be used in ethanol.262 California’s
consideration of the energy sources used in crop cultivation and
ethanol production also implicitly penalized ethanol producers for
operating in jurisdictions with less stringent GHG emission
policies than those in place in the Golden State. If the rule against
extraterritorial regulation remains in force, this would seem to be a
problem.
Although it acknowledged that California’s rules gave
favorable treatment to some in-state crude oil sources, the Ninth
Circuit upheld the differential treatment on the grounds that the
rules did not systematically advantage in-state over out-of-state
producers.263 Specifically, one source of in-state crude was
257. 511 U.S. at 101 n.5.
258. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1097.
259. Rocky Mountain Ethanol, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1093; Corey, 730 F.3d at
1109 (Murguia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
260. Rocky Mountain Ethanol, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1093–94; Corey, 730 F.3d
at 1110 (Murguia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
261. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1109 (Murguia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
262. Rocky Mountain Ethanol, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1091.
263. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1098–101.
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assigned a carbon intensity as an “existing” HCICO less than half
of its actual carbon intensity.264 While other in-state sources did
not receive equally favorable treatment, no out-of-state source was
similarly advantaged, some were disadvantaged, and assigned
carbon intensity values above their actual levels.265
The Ninth Circuit concluded that CARB’s treatment of crude
oil was permissible because CARB did not systematically
advantage in-state producers and penalize out-of-state producers.
However, this analysis miscomprehends the relevant inquiry. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly found state and local measures to be
impermissibly protectionist when they have advantaged a subset of
local producers, such as those in or around a given locality.266
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is not exclusively concerned
with blanket preferences for local-over-foreign products, nor is it
necessary for advantaged producers to represent a large share of
the relevant market.267
The Rocky Mountain Farmers Union cases present particularly
challenging Dormant Commerce Clause issues. California’s lowcarbon fuel regulations unquestionably reach out-of-state
conduct—how given motor fuels are created—and penalize energy
consumption for the transportation of such fuels. In California’s
defense, accounting for all energy use in the development,
production, and transportation of motor fuels is necessary to limit
GHG emissions resulting from fuel consumption. Were California
to ignore emissions throughout the “lifecycle,” and instead adopt
regulations solely governing the production and combustion of fuel
within the state, it is possible that the state’s regulations would
actually produce a net increase in carbon emissions. This could
occur if, for instance, out-of-state fuel producers gained a
competitive advantage by using less costly, but more carbonintensive, feed stocks and production processes than fuels
regulated in the state. Then again, the actual regulations California
adopted appear to turn on geographical location more than may
have been necessary to account for lifecycle emissions.
One argument in California’s defense is particularly telling.
Defenders of the fuel standards note that Congress has embraced

264. Id. at 1098.
265. Id. at 1098–99.
266. See supra Parts III and IV.
267. The Ninth Circuit thought it relevant that the benefited in-state sources
comprised 16.1% of the market while disadvantaged in-state sources comprised
22.6% of the market. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1099.
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reliance upon lifecycle analysis.268 Perhaps it has, but this does not
address the Dormant Commerce Clause concern. The underlying
premise of the doctrine is that there are some sorts of regulatory
measures that are exclusively within the province of the national
government and off limits to the states. Insofar as addressing GHG
emissions requires considering the full lifecycle emissions of fuels
and products—and insofar as such consideration requires
sanctioning transportation and evaluating the implications of a
given geographic source location—climate policies of the sort
California envisions may well be beyond its reach.
In January 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit denied the challengers’ petition for rehearing en
banc,269 and in June, the Supreme Court denied both the fuel
producers and California’s petitions for certiorari.270 This is not the
end of the matter, however, as the case will continue in district
court. As Judge Gould explained in his opinion concurring in the
denial of rehearing en banc, the panel did not “conclusively
determine[]” that California’s regulations satisfied the Dormant
Commerce Clause.271 Rather, he explained, all the court did was
“reject the argument that the LCFS’s ethanol provisions facially
discriminate against out-of-state commerce.”272 The panel
remanded the case for consideration of the challengers’ other
arguments because the court concluded, “findings of fact and more
proceedings in the district court were needed to determine the
LCFS’s constitutionality.”273

268. Debra Kahn, California Adopts Low-Carbon Fuel Standard, SCIENTIFIC
AM. (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/californiaadopts-low-car/, archived at http://perma.cc/AP4X-LYT8.
269. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), reh'g en banc denied, 740 F.3d
507 (9th Cir. 2014).
270. The fuel producers sought review of the Dormant Commerce Clause
claims. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013)
(No. 13-1148), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Am. Fuel & Petrochemicals Ass'n v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2013) (No. 13-1149), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014). California, on the
other hand, sought Supreme Court review of the lower courts’ conclusion that
the Dormant Commerce claims were not preempted by the Clean Air Act.
Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Corey v. Rocky Mountain
Farmers Union, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-1308), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 2884 (2014).
271. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 509 (9th Cir. 2014) (Gould, J., concurring in the
denial of rehearing en banc).
272. Id.
273. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Despite the limitations imposed by the Dormant Commerce
Clause, states retain ample ability to enact environmental
regulations and otherwise control the environmental effects of
energy use and production within their borders. States potentially
run into trouble when they seek to insulate themselves from the
potential competitive effects by enacting potentially costly
regulations or extend the reach of their regulatory choices to those
in other jurisdictions. So, while states remain free to enact such
measures, structural, constitutional limitations may discourage
states from enacting desired policies. By some accounts, this is
precisely what the Framers would have intended: forcing each
jurisdiction to bear the competitive consequences of its own policy
choices.274
Concerned that interjurisdictional competition may discourage
too many states from acting, some commentators believe the
Supreme Court is too rigid in its application of these constraints,
particularly in the environmental context.275 Given recent trends in
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, these commentators
may get their wish for less stringent enforcement of the doctrine. In
recent years, several Justices have expressed dissatisfaction with
the doctrine, and the Court appears ready to back away from at
least some aspects of the doctrine, such as the bar on
extraterritoriality and the balancing of in-state benefits against
burdens on interstate commerce under the Pike test.276
How state climate and energy polices fare in court will
ultimately depend on which path the Supreme Court takes. Strict
enforcement of the doctrine as it stands could trim the protectionist
trappings from many a state’s RPS program and limit California’s
aggressive experimentation with regulation of fuels. A more
relaxed approach—potentially driven by the Court’s most
conservative Justices—would give states greater ability to adopt
the energy and climate policies of their choice, even at the expense
of out-of-state producers. The fates of state climate change policies
and the Dormant Commerce Clause are tied together.

274. See generally MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION
(2013).
275. See e.g., Engel, supra note 114; Klein, Environmental Commerce
Clause, supra note 104, at 43–44; Klass & Henley, Energy Policy, supra note
12.
276. See Denning, supra note 112; Williams & Denning, supra note 103.

